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ABSTRACT: This paper advances a fresh theorization of historicity.  The word and concept of 
historicity has become so widespread and popular that they have ceased to have definite meaning 
and are used to stand for unsupported notions of the values inherent in human experience.  This 
paper attempts to repair the concept by re-defining it as the temporal aspect of the 
interdependence of life; having history is to have a life intertwined with the lives of all others and 
with the universe.  After separating out the looser uses, surveying some of the literature, and 
defining what needs to be done, the paper examines shortcomings in the very different and widely 
influential conceptions of historicity of Koselleck and Heidegger.  It then advances a new 
conception and fits it into the theoretical and moral capabilities of the philosophy of history as a 
core of philosophical anthropology. 
KEYWORDS: Historicity; Temporality; Philosophy of history; Koselleck; Hartog; Heidegger; 
Gadamer; Ethics 
 
1.  IN NEED OF HISTORICITY. 
In creating new historical approaches throughout the human and social sciences 
during the last fifty years, many scholars have used the word “historicity” to 
signify the special status of the historical subject, inquiry, approach, or concept 
they use.  These usages stray far from the conceptions of historicity of Count Paul 
Yorck von Wartenburg, Martin Heidegger, and others, which founded an 
ontology of human life that could have something like complexity, depth, value, 
and interest for us beyond the boundaries of conventional historical inquiry.  In 
Yorck’s words, “the germ cell of historicity” is “something that lives” taken in its 
“entire given psycho-physical reality.”  This something was the human person; its 
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entirety, the circumpressure of history binding it to its self-reflexivity.1  It was to 
be a bulwark, built upon the reformed humanism of hermeneutics, against a 
positivist reduction of human meaningfulness.  Anthropologists, literary 
historians, theorists of art,  and wide-bore speculators about society, culture, and 
human existence alike use historicity under this broad approach to mean 
something very special and potent, although they use the word in many different 
ways.  
But Yorck’s ground of “something that lives” has come to pose a very difficult 
problem for the idea of historicity that is different from what he might have 
expected.  The challenge today to support a defensible concept of meaning and 
value in human life comes only in lesser part from the form of scientistic reduction 
that worried philosophy early (and later) in the twentieth century.  The more 
potent challenge now comes from the critique of the thinning distinction between 
the human and the natural and the many powerful reasons to hold these together 
in one system of values.2  The idea of historicity should now serve us to address 
the problems of value as posed by integration of the human and natural worlds, 
different from and in addition to the problems of value to which the distinction 
between the human and the material was addressed.  “Historicity” is a battle-
ground for this re-evaluation.  The concepts must be freshly theorized. 
My first aim here is to apply a siccative to the range of ideas that the word 
currently expresses.  The baggy use of the term by thinkers in many fields 
weakens the philosophical worth of the concept.  Sometimes it slips into being a 
factual externality, quite opposite to Yorck’s and Heidegger’s ideas; and many 
times it is even a nearly empty signifier.  Within the philosophy of history, it is 
 
1 Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Yorck v. Wartenburg, Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1923, 71–72, 69, 
109, as cited and translated by Ingo Farin, “Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/yorck/ 
2 The hard line between the organic and the inorganic is weakening as well.  Also we are by now familiar 
with the interdependence of the human with the machinic and know that human dependence on technology 
has deep ontological implications.  As practical problems in historiography, these developments will be 
accommodated by historians’ creativity.  As theoretical problems, I leave them for another time, on the 
premise that historicity is an attribute of consciousness and so can, for now at least, be restricted to living 
things; indeed, extending it to all life as a speculative matter is already a very large stretch, in part because 
the science of the matter is far from settled.  Beyond these concerns, the argument that all events and entities 
are interdependent because they are part of the same causal sequence that is reality does not eliminate the 
present approach to historicity just because this claim is so universal that it cannot negate all attempts to 
make distinctions for various purposes. 
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used both in a banal semiotic range and in some very influential, more 
sophisticated forms.  
In this framework, the most conceptually sophisticated versions of 
historicity—the historic-theoretic concepts of Reinhard Koselleck and François 
Hartog and the philosophical ideas of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg  
Gadamer—deserve a critical examination with the aim of seeking a justifiable 
idea of historicity that better serves the moral, cultural, and social aim of 
understanding our relation to the past by replacing the old easy idea of defining 
history as the human thing absent from the natural.  Critique of these thinkers is 
the second aim of this paper. 
The last part of this paper will argue for a conception of historicity that 
responds to the broad re-evaluation of the cosmic interdependence of life.  
Historicity thus renewed denotes the intertwining of one’s life with other lives and 
with all life.  This meaning best applies historicity to those issues in which, in my 
view, philosophical anthropology rooted in philosophy of history ought now to 
work; it is the meaning that the word historicity can now denote for which it is 
really worth keeping, refining, and using the word.3  We must see this universal 
historicity as best we can see it from within the human point of view that we 
cannot escape even as it enlargens and develops in our hands.  Think of this essay 
as a reparative project.  
2.  DISAMBIGUATING HISTORICITY. 
Anglophone philosophy of history is obliged to squeeze many meanings out of 
the word “history.”  Because of this I start by stipulating two disambiguations.   
(1).  In Biblical studies historicity has a tight technical meaning: when these 
scholars invigilate the historicity of an action or event that the Bible, especially 
the New Testament, recounts, they are specifically asking, did it really happen or 
not?  In philosophy of history the best practice will be to separate the use of 
historicity to mean an event’s or person’s factuality, as in this technical usage in 
Biblical scholarship, from that which is proper to the consciousness of historical 
experience and, more instantly, in terms of what philosophical good we want the 
concept to do, with an eye to the ultimate moral good we want to do when  
 
3 I discuss these issues, and my general views, in A Personalist Philosophy of History (Routledge, 2019). 
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theorizing concepts of value.   
(2).  Sometimes “historicity” is used to refer to the fact that a person, object, 
or event is of interest to historians or to non-academic but disciplined 
historiography.4  Instead, let us call this “historicality,” for something has this 
historicality because it has a tangibility and an allure we call the historical.5  This 
distinction is useful, though not absolute: for example, both notions concern time, 
which provides them a porous boundary.  
The simplest use of historicity is to mean nothing other than the just quality 
or state of having a history—that is, of being a being with a history or of being a 
group of beings with a history or histories.  The loosest use of the term has little 
or no more content than this.  Writers use it when they want it to do very special, 
hard, and vital work for their scholarship, even when they have thought through 
or researched much about the concept.  But even within philosophy of history, 
where we expect specialization, there is a zone of imprecision in which we find 
definitions akimbo like cowlicks.  Let just a few examples from recent philosophy 
of history stand for many.  Here are several admirable recent papers and books 
that discuss historicity from various points of view without ever managing to 
define the word.  Each of the following uses historicity in theorizing from a 
different point of view. 
Sometimes the term is used so casually as to suggest almost nothing of its 
meaning.  In one case, the abstract tells us that the paper aims “to investigate the 
historicity of disciplinary forms” of historiography,” yet it appears only once more, 
where it seems to be a synonym for subjectivity, at least in so far as both refer to 
mobile and multiple “categories” of temporal change; there is no further 
definition.”6  In another case, it appears to be just a marker for something’s having 
 
4 I make this distinction as a way of using English words to differentiate these two concepts.  The German 
use of geschichtlichkeit does not make this distinction, and translations into English sometimes use both 
historicity and historicality to mean the same thing, as, for example, in Chris Lawn and Niall Keane’s The 
Gadamer Dictionary, London: Continuum, 2011, 81. 
5 This stipulation roughly accords with the development in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of 
definition B.3 of “historic” and definition B.1.b of “historical” in the Oxford English Dictionary. 
6 Rodrigo Turin, “Between the Disciplinary Past and the Practical Past: Figurations of the Historian in the 
Crisis of the Humanities,” Tempo, vol. 24, no. 2, May/August, 2018, 189–205, doi: 10.1590/TEM-1980-
542X2018v240201.  
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been in the historical past.7  One interesting paper follows a sociological literature 
on historicity but avoids every philosophical aspect of it.8  It seems that in such 
cases the authors do not know that the term has philosophical depth built up over 
two centuries; or they do not think the term has, or could have, any further 
determinate content that is useful today; or that they have not considered the 
matter while concentrating on concepts more central to their work. 
In other cases, the author gives substantial attention to “historicity” but in a 
way  that raises questions that are better examined than presumed answered.  
One serious and comprehensive phenomenological study builds to a climax 
around historicity, but explicitly defines it only as the quality that separates the 
human from the natural.9  In a book that makes a significant and resourceful 
contribution to the place of pragmatism in philosophy of history we read that 
“Historicity refers to the determinate contents through which transitions occur.” 
This is a “slide” of historicity into externalities, which, though not exactly so-
called objective facts, endanger personal and human meanings.10  In such usages, 
Hegel’s original idea of historicity as “that exceptional mode of the self-relation 
of self-consciousness” to its own history by which Spirit, or Life, knows itself seems 
continually to slip down into the descriptive.11  Finally, one of the most important 
recent papers in philosophy of history gives a sophisticated, and advanced theory 
of present and future historicities in which the word “history” or “the historical” 
(in the sense to which I stipulated above) could be substituted for “historicity” at 
almost every point.12 
These loose usages account for part of what Henning Trüper calls “flatness” 
 
7 Antonio Y. Vasquez-Arroyo, “Critical Theory, Colonialism, and the Historicity of Thought,” Constellations, 
vol. 25, 2018, 54-70, doi: 10.1111/1467-8675.12348. 
8 Marc Ereshevsky and Derek Turner, “Historicity and Explanation,” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.02.002. 
9 Richard Campbell, Truth and History, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, 395–411. 
10 Colin Koopman, Pragmatism and Transition: Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2009, 16. 
11 Herbert Marcuse, Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, trans. Seyla Benhabib, Cambridge, MIT Press, 
1987, 323. 
12 Zoltán Boldiszár Simon, “The Transformation of Historical Time: Processual and Evental 
Temporalities,” in Rethinking Historical Time, ed. Marek Tamm and Laurent Olivier, London, Bloomsbury, 
2019, 71–86. 
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of the term.13  By this he means that it promises more than it delivers.  He 
attributes the degeneration of the concept from its origins in hermeneutics, rich 
with experiential and existential meaning, to a successful structuralist and post-
structuralist critique of subjectivity.  A wide range of thinkers pick up the hollow 
fragments of the concept that remain, and their use of them betrays “a chimeric 
beast” due to mere magical thinking or a kind of nostalgia for autonomous 
personhood.  He concludes that the concept of historicity is addled and 
unfixable—he gives it “a diagnosis of catachrestic blockage.”14  Even though some 
of the uses  mentioned above arise from much more than a sentiment of re-
enchantment, many others among the hundreds of thousands of uses that 
searches of databases return do turn into a pulpous All-One because they reach 
for a real significance they had not rigorously worked out.  But the failure of “the 
promise of wholeness and appropriation” by phenomenology does not mean that 
there can be no real depth to the concept, any more than baggy, unsophisticated 
uses vitiate it.15 
Trüper also argues that because history, meaning historiography, both distorts 
reality by abstracting details from the universe of facts about the past—generally 
for the purpose of giving accounts of causal relations—but also cannot represent 
the past with full ontological truthfulness since historians exclude and include 
facts, it must operate on the basis of a desire for truth and meaning that is nothing 
more than a desire to transcend finitude.16  Marjorie Grene noted this problem 
in 1978 in simpler form: that we are more complicated than both our histories 
and our ontology.17  Building provisionally on her argument with some terms I 
have added from American Pragmatism and personalism, the complex inter-
relationship of our inner selves and the natural world is the condition of culture 
specific to the inquiry of conscious beings into their world; and this is neither an 
ontological conundrum nor a logical or semantic puzzle but our  unavoidable 
and undividable moral lives.  I will develop this provisional thesis as a repair of 
 
13 Henning Trüper,“The Flatness of Historicity,” History and Theory, vol. 58, no. 1, March, 2018, 23–49, doi: 
10.1111/hith.12098. 
14 Trüper, “Flatness,” 46. 
15 Trüper, “Flatness,” 36, referring to Heidegger. 
16 Trüper, “Flatness,” 27–29, 34.  I summarize and simplify his complex argument throughout his essay. 
17 Marjorie Grene, “The Paradoxes of Historicity,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 32, no. 1, September, 1978, 
15–36. 
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the concept with ideas other than those dead-ends that Trüper dissects out of 
existential phenomenology and out of post-modernist critique. 
3.  EXCAVATING HISTORICITY. 
In order to repair historicity, we have to understand that historicity was and is 
itself a  reparative concept.  There is a mandorla of meaningfulness around the 
word.  People use it, however fecklessly, to help repair the broken connection of 
human action to values, of our life within nature to our aspiration to be good and 
just as well as to survive, of what we empirically know to what we desire to speak 
of morally.  On a broad view, it was devised in order to help fill the vacuum that 
the vast battery of dehumanizing technological and societal mechanization 
created for most thinking people.  The term is but one piece of the multiform and 
polygonal responses to the supposed disenchantment of the real world over the 
last two centuries.  It was and is a marker for the meaningfulness of experience 
and the values of human existence that the concept the word names came to be 
invented.  At the point in time in which philosophy of history in its canonical 
modern sense was initiated, the problems of squaring a moral order with the 
temporal and logical orders of disenchanted nature enveloped a lot of the 
axiology, culture, anthropology, natural science, psychology, and general 
philosophy throughout the nineteenth century until the force of historicity—a 
word and concept first unfolded by Hegel—emerged in the work of Dilthey.18 
On this understanding of the desire for a powerful and meaningful concept 
of historicity, Trüper is right.  And it is not only a set-theoretic approach that can 
undermine an ontology for historicity, it is weaknesses in the ontology that 
generated the original dominant understanding of historicity that also undermine 
it.  But it is to neither an ontological, nor an empirical, not a logical approach 
that we must look if we are to find a use and significance that the term can aptly 
express. Rather, the“desire” for magic that troubles Trüper is so ancient, 
 
18 Naturally there are huge parts of the history of the philosophical use of this concept that I will not treat 
here.  The development of “historicity” from Hegel through Heine and Haym to Dilthey and Yorck, with 
most attention paid to the stages of Dilthey’s conceptualization, is described in Leonhard von Renthe-Fink, 
Geschichtlichkeit: Ihr terminologischer und begrifflicher Ursprung bei Hegel, Haym, Dilthey und Yorck, Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1968.  Gerhard Bauer’s “Geschichtlichkeit”: Wege und Urrwege eines Begriffs, Berlin: 
de Gruyter, 1963, takes in a wider perspective—from Vico to National Socialist use of the concept to post-
war thinkers and even the natural sciences. 
 BENNETT GILBERT 61 
perennial, and universal that it ought not to be dismissed on the basis of the one 
kind of ontology that generated it or of its set-theoretic logic.  These matters are 
narrow in comparison with the “desire”: the desire to gain by inquiry the 
accumulated story of our actions and behavior some truthful self-understanding 
of  “the place cleared within nature for the possibility of the human” (in Grene’s 
words) that will help us guides our lives through the most desperate difficulties.19 
Having set aside the less than adroit usages referred to above and before 
arguing an affirmative account of repaired historicity, a critique of the two fully 
developed and influential uses of “historicity” that today dominate philosophy of 
history will  help to show what how the tradition of the concept has formed and 
to specify what is needed to meet a profound new twist in the problem of human 
meaning.  Looking at these from the wide points of view of our self-understanding 
and grounding of meaning rather than for their failings as ontology or as logic, 
we will see what they would have needed, and what we now need, to understand 
historicity as a morally—that is, an ethically, politically, socially, and culturally—
reparative concept, that same need behind the loose or flat usages which fall short 
of fulfilling it, and the same need that Trüper gives up on.  The critique of these 
two kinds of historicity will suggest that revised and updated ideas of personhood 
and human existence can form a conception of historicity that will serve the 
cultural and moral purposes of philosophizing a human past no longer fully 
distinct from nature’s past.  These two established kinds of historicity are (1). the 
historic-theoretical and (2). the phenomenological.  
(1).  In Reinhard Koselleck’s theory of history what we know as history is the 
invention of the laying-bare epoch that began with the turn of the Enlightenment 
into that specific historical consciousness which followed upon the French and 
Industrial Revolutions and which is common to scholarly knowledge of history, 
and perhaps to all awareness of the past, since then.  The past that had been the 
cosmically pre-determined divine plan, iterated like a liturgy, changed into a 
collective of non-repeatable events requiring detailed research if it is to exist at 
all.  Geschichte was the name then given to this corpus.20  We see history, not as 
God does but as witnesses do, by being aware of what it is to witness, that is, 
 
19 Grene, “Paradoxes,” 34. 
20 Reinhard Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2004, 27–37. 
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properly to aver what one knows from one’s experience by self-awareness of one’s 
place in history. Koselleck calls this “positional commitment.”21  This experience 
to which historians testify is that of their own accumulated knowledge, a 
comprehension of what they know and how they conceptualize what they know 
that sublates mystery. 
Historicity then is one type of self-aware historical existence invented by and 
for a time and place to do a specific job.22  This was “to subject historical time to 
a critique which could only be derived from an understanding of history itself ”23; 
and it issued in historicity and philosophy of history as the form of thought that 
developed to an unprecedented and very high degree the principle that the 
“temporal experience of reality and the productive exploration and inspection of 
this lived reality condition each other and belong together inseparably.”24  
Philosophy of history exists, or existed, as the phase of the belonging-together of 
conception and production, action and self-reflection that was, or is, the object it 
works upon.  “Historicity” worked to arrest that content before its own 
understanding of a temporality of ceaseless change swept the present out of its 
conceptual domain.  Historicity was to prevent this “presentism” from eating 
itself, to give to that order of things the stability it needed to engender its goals, 
to protect the victors of the revolutions of the Sattelzeit from those who wanted 
more revolutions in accord with the order of time and justice.25  It was devised as 
a rein upon the wild beast of time.  It is thought’s self-repair of the problem of the 
moving present.26 
François Hartog, in part following Koselleck, argues that historicity is 
multiple and that each historicity is one specific, long-dominant, circumscribed, 
mortal “regime of historicity,” and that there will be others.  Comes now the end 
of ours, a different historicity to follow it,  as if on a track or belt inevitably moving 
 
21 Koselleck, Futures Past, 136–140. 
22 Reinhard Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, trans. Todd Samuel 
Presner, et al., Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, 2–3. 
23 Koselleck, Practice, 119. 
24 Koselleck, Practice, 46–47. 
25 Koselleck, Practice, 83. 
26 I present here only the aspect of Koselleck’s thought most proximate to my purpose, so it should be noted 
that his historicity is grounded in a group of ideas that issue in his theorization of the history of concepts, 
including repetitive structures, “simultaneity of the non-simultaneous,” and, most famously, “space of 
experience and horizon of expectation.” 
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along to a dumpster.27  In this sense, the historicity that was supposed to stop 
historicization failed.  As a way to observe temporalities, which supposedly braid 
themselves together or which historians assemble in their constructions, regimes 
of historicity are transient, mutating according to the conceptions of historians.28  
Hartog explicitly points out that historicity is not “an external standard” but “is 
constructed by the historian,” a “tool....to examine our relations to time 
historically.”29 
For Koselleck and Hartog, historicity is both the medium and the object of 
historiographic inquiry.  Modern history goes through it and to it.  Into historicity 
both topic and method integrate.  Koselleck’s historicity is still ideal, in that both 
its constituents are constructions; at the same time, it is also real and objective, in 
that historicity is subjected to scientific study.  It becomes an externality, of the 
type noted above.  This study of historicities is theoretical in the Kantian sense, 
especially in the rather dry form of intellectual history that Koselleck, along with 
others, invented.  This historicity thus follows historicality—that which interests 
the historians—with its self-reflective maintenance of the objective stance of 
empirical examination (somewhat trimmed) amidst our limiting determinations.  
But when historicity is generated by interests in the historical, there is no purpose 
or content left for the concept of historicity, because it has been channeled in such 
a way that only one kind of knowledge and one kind of meaning safely emerge 
from a method designed to blunt our situated dispositions in order to produce 
factual truths. 
But of course the case that the objective kind of knowledge and meaning is 
 
27 François Hartog, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time, trans. Saskia Brown, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2015, 104–114ff. 
28 Hartog regards modernity as an age in which “the present” replaced both past and future.  I regard this 
use of “presentism” as one of a body of usages of the term that is even more tangled and inconsistent than 
“historicity” in philosophy of history nd across philosophical fields.  For this reason and for the sake of 
economy of space I do not here further address this aspect of his thought. 
29 Hartog, Regimes, xv–xix and 16–18.  Following Koselleck, Harttog also describes historicity as “generated 
by the distance, and tension, between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation” (17); he also 
views a historicities as ways “the present has been construed” (195; cf. 28–29); and he also says (following 
Marshall Sahlins) that a historicity is a “how past, present, and future are articulated” (40).  Yet are these 
things confined to historians as their tools?  Are they not part of everyone’s mentality?  Even if we set aside 
the question of the compatibility of these and other statements in Regimes, the relationship of hustorians yo 
everyone else “within” or with respect to history is a problem in this kind of approach to historicity—and a 
moral problem at that. 
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good and useful does not mean that there are no other useful kinds.  For the 
knowers, that is, all those who, living in temporality, receive the experience of the 
past, knowledge and meaning are not of one kind alone.  There is more than one 
kind of knowledge and meaning for cognizing persons, whose complexity is closer 
to infinity than even the uncountable set of past facts.  As Montaigne says, our 
inquiries are endless, the mind’s nourishment consists in amazement and 
uncertainty and keeps us in wonder, knowledge is ambiguous and flowing like 
water endlessly rolling over a riverbed, we always stretch our thoughts out and 
endlessly advance them.30  In addition to becoming a sort of positive reduction, 
this kind of historicity has no resources for more current issues of meaningfulness. 
(2). Historicity under the phenomenological approach takes the contrary 
course: it precedes historicality, is the opposite of an externality, and addresses a 
full range of meaningfulness unconstricted by scientific knowledge.31  A different 
problem arises. 
The most famous conception of historicity is Heidegger’s stunning 
unwrapping of it out of the massed factuality of historiography (Historizität or, as 
he calls it, “historiology”) in sections 72–77 of part two of Being and Time.32  Like 
a poor person finding a bag of gold, or as if by surprise a wall comes down that 
reveals an unsuspected room in a house, the power of the statement follows 
immediately upon its announcement, appearing as self-evident, completely 
revealed upon seeing it, like the unanticipated gold or the unknown room.  The 
claim and its consequences, which Heidegger circles round and round, reveal 
themselves in one moment, so to speak.  But if we look at this move just on its 
own, its probative reach is limited.  Historicity appears in it in a space evacuated 
by empiricist construction of experience of the past and by “scientific” 
 
30 Michel de Montaigne, “On Experience,” in The Complete Essays, trans. M. A. Screech, London: Penguin, 
2003, 1211–1212. 
31 It should be noted that, despite the opposition here between phenomenological approach to the concept 
of historicity and the way in which Koselleck and others use it, Heudegger and others influenced some 
historians, including Koselleck, in various ways.  And it must also be noted that the way in which I criticize 
Koelleck’s views is not the same way in which a phenomenologist might criticize them, although the 
critiques overlap in some neasure. 
32 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany, NY, State University of New York 
Press, 2010, 355–383 (German 372–404). 
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historiography.33  The claim for historicity itself is what deports or sets aside 
historiography.  
Beneath his exposition, Heidegger silently asks us whether we can psychically 
tolerate a final understanding of that sum of human experience called history 
that lacks any axiology.  If “history” is just the action of physical, or even social, 
cause and effect, and assuming one can no longer believe in its teleology, then it 
has no meaning.  Heidegger implicitly makes this claim, we all sense that it is a 
correct analysis, and most of us would be disappointed to find that it is true or to 
learn that we must stop inquiry at this point.  Therefore, if history is to have 
meaning—this is a rough and broad way of putting this desire—there must be 
some other depth to inquire into.  This is geschichtlichkeit, historicity.  We take it by 
default, as it were, just where we want to find and grasp it.  It appears right there 
as a something outside of the rationalist and empiricist, scientistic or logical terms 
that must invalidate our consideration of it before we started or got very far.  Such 
is the way of insight and is in this case an insight of genius.34 
But upon accepting this pathway from historiography to historicity, from what 
we have in the practical operations our intellect to what we suspect or at least 
desire to be at the foundation of thought, and experience, and even being, we 
must also recognize a pathway back to historiography.  Without this, “historicity” 
either is merely a genteel declaration of the degeneracy of positivism or a suave 
but hollow promise.  The track runs both ways; the train must be able to back up 
as well as go forward, to serve both depots, to cart what they share.  How can 
there be historicity without history?  It cannot be, and therefore the mutual 
linkage ought to account for their interdependence.  Otherwise, historicity does 
not give us any actual contexture of meaning.  The integral force of the original 
intuitive claim for historicity would fail without a way back to the forms of 
meaningfulness of human experience that historicity is supposed to support.  If it 
fails, we would have to say that Heidegger managed to achieve the generative 
 
33 Heidegger’s target, narrowly conceived, was the positivist historical theory then dominant in Germany; 
but once he approached history from the thematization of temporal experience developed by Edmund 
Husserl, his critique had a much wider and more profound range. 
34 Cf. Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression. Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation, 
trans. Tracy Colony, London, Continuum, 2010,  45–48. 
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solipsism that Husserl worked so hard to avoid.35 
Does Heidegger show us this way “back”?  To be clear, I speak here solely of 
the early Heidegger as he speaks up to and in Being and Time.36  He adds to the 
basic realization of historicity the other parts of Dasein, such as thrown-ness and 
care.37  However, these are inward matters.  They do not link one person to other 
persons.  His Dasein with its (or her) death-oriented historicity is like a convex 
mirror, isolating and rather forcefully  miniaturizing and essentializing (in a very 
informal sense of the word) the life within.38  We can see that move as the kernel 
of this notion of historicity when in 1920–1921 he describes our reception of the 
world around us as the “intensification” (steigerung) of a manifold that envelopes 
and can distract us, an inward clarifying of the obscuring abundance of our social 
and common experience.39  In Being and Time this is an Innerweltlichkeit; it becomes 
the “existential interpretation of the historicity of Dasein,” “the authentic 
disclosedness (‘truth’)” (Erschlossenheit) that is distinct from, though immanent in, 
historiography.40  Against it the “changing appearance and disappearance of 
events” is  inauthentic, and yet it must be that Dasein is exposed to these events 
and must return to be among them in order to take advantage of its own 
possibilities for authenticity.41 
The domain of the manifold from which Heidegger seeks relief he calls the 
 
35 Enzo Traverso in his intellectual history of the Europe of two world wars, Fire and Blood: the European Civil 
War 1914–1945, trans. David Fernbach, London, Verso, 2016, 196–199, reads Heidegger not only as isolated 
from society but fearful of it, specifically arguing that his Sorge was really fear.   
36 In his exhaustive study of Heidegger’s concept, Hans Ruin says that “The specific "theory" of historicity 
advanced in Being and Time is only a way-station....” in his Enigmatic Origins: Tracing the Theme of Historicity 
Through Heidegger’s Work, Stockholm, 1994, xiii. 
37 The issue I discuss here is to be distinguished from the possibility of a “Heideggerian ethics of care” as 
developed by Babette Babich, Michael Theunissen, and others. 
38 Heidegger, a close reader of St, Augustine, formed his notion of our orientation toward death on 
Augustine’s idea of our intentio toward the future (making it present in the soul) but substituted death for the 
afterlife with God that Augustine held we reach toward. 
39 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Winter Semester 1919/1920, trans.  Scott M. Campbell, 
London, Bloomsbury, 2013, 191 (App. B, sec. 21). 
40 Heidegger, Being and Time, 377 (397). 
41 Heidegger, Being and Time, 361 (379).  The phenomenologist Claude Romano expressed this problem in 
Heidegger with great precision in a recent lecture “From Event to Selfhood: An Intellectual Journey” that 
he has posted at 
https://www.academia.edu/28344448/Identity_and_Selfhood_Paul_Ric%C5%93ur_s_Contribution_an
d_its_Continuation 
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“with-world” (Mitwelt), and his early attempt to maintain a link to collective life 
he calls Mitgeschehen, or events-with-others.42  In Being and Time their descendent 
is “being-with” (Mitsein), or empathy.  It is the only resource for solving the kind 
of problem I have described, since the events in the circumpressuring external 
human world always turn out to be inauthentic; and yet the account of Mitsein as 
empathy (Einfühling) is just a grudging sketch, a rare pealing buoy-bell obscured 
in the surging sea of Dasein’s concern for itself.43  “The ownmost possibility is 
nonrelational”—because and only because Heidegger provides nonrelationality 
as tautologically included in ownmost-ness.44  There is a considerable literature 
attempting to show that the account of empathy in Being and Time is adequate, but 
the claim is almost always presented as a “fleshing out,” a “leaping ahead,” “a 
creative restructuring,” or as “going beyond a beginning.”45 
In sum, Koselleck-Hartog historicity falls unacceptably close to a positivist 
explainer, even as its valuable historiographic production aims to understand the 
course of thought by political and social theoretical concepts.  Heidegger’s 
historicity, on the other hand, in its discompassionate heroic-poetic stance, by 
which it searches out stillness to liberate awareness and to re-ground meaning, 
was responding to the challenge of positivist reduction but, even setting aside its 
defects with respect to human caring and collective relationships, still leaves us to 
find a way to face the newer problem of the interdependence of all forms of life. 
 
42 See Christian Ferencz-Faltz’s parallel reading of the early work, “The Element of Intersubjectivity: 
Heidegger’s Early Conception of Empathy,” Contemporary Philosophical Review, vol. 48, 2015, 479–496, doi 
10.1007/s11007-015-9350-4. 
43 Notably Heidegger, Being and Time, 267 (278) and 121–122 (125); and as Einfühlung, 124–125 (128–129). 
44 Heidegger, Being and Time, 252–254 (263–265). 
45 See Peg E. Birmingham, “Logos and the Place of the Other,” Research in Phenomenology, vol. 20, no. 1, 1990, 
34–55,  https://doi.org/10.1163/156916490X00036; Fred R. Dallmayr, “Heidegger on Intersubjectivity,” 
Human Studies, vol. 3, No. 3, July, 1980, 221–246, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02331811;  Irene McMullin, 
Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2013, which 
offers the most affirmative account of empathy in Heidegger; Mahon O’Brien, “Leaping Ahead of 
Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Being and Time,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 
vol. 22, no. 4, 2014, 534–551, doi: 10.1080/09672559.2014.948719; Frederick A.  Olafson, Heidegger and the 
Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998; Robert D.  Stolorow, 
“Fleshing out Heidegger's ‘Mitsein” (Review of Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations by 
IreneMcMullin), Human Studies, vol. 37, no. 1, Spring 2014, 161–166, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-014-
9309-1; and Jin Xiping’s critique, “Heidegger’s Conception of Being-with (Mitsein) and His Simple 
Designation of Social and Political Reality in the Black Notebooks,” Frontiers of Philosophy in China, vol. 11, no. 
3, December, 2016, 415–429., https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-005-016-0030-8. 
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4.  REPAIRING HISTORICITY.     
The problem that our notion of historicity must now address is not only what 
meaning there is in human history but also how to maintain any such meaning 
when it must enter into closer integration with nature than we were accustomed 
to conceive of.  Where philosophy of history from Vico to Collingwood and after 
has taken historicity as the attribute peculiar to humankind that distinguishes it 
from the natural, historical inquiry follows powerful philosophical developments 
and scientific discoveries in seeing that whatever it is that is human—even the 
uniquely human—has come to be within the processes of a natural cosmos; and 
also that the domain of the natural cannot be understood as mechanism or as 
matter in the conventional sense, for we cannot escape the inherent structure of 
our ability to know.  Physical nature and life of all kinds have a reality that always 
exceeds our ways of segmenting them and our definite conceptions of either 
domain. 
In this sense we must always strain to grasp reality more deeply.  But there is 
another sense in which understanding this principle is not only an instrument for 
the voyage of our intelligence into what hitherto was unfathomable.  It is also an 
urgent matter. 
The first lesson a disaster teaches is that everything is connected. In fact, disasters, 
I found, ... are crash courses in those connections.  At moments of immense change, 
we see with new clarity the systems—political, economic, social, ecological—in 
which we are immersed as they change around us.  We see what’s strong, what’s 
weak, what’s corrupt, what matters and what doesn’t.46 
Rebecca Solnit wrote this in response the worldwide epidemic of the novel 
coronavirus known as Covid19 in the first half of 2020.  We are not immune: not 
as bodies or as selves or as spirits, not as groups or nations, not as a species, neither 
externally nor internally.  We and the world around us are co-terminous in 
fundamental and ineliminable ways. Life, pursuing its uncountably many courses, 
shares the resources of its world, both spreading out and meeting among them.   
History must therefore be the site of our interdependence with all life.  
Historicity is the temporal aspect of  the interdependence of  life; and human historicity is the 
 
46 Rebecca Solnit, “‘The impossible has already happened’: what coronavirus can teach us about hope.  In 
the midst of fear and isolation, we are learning that profound, positive change is possible,” The Guardian, 
April 7, 2020. 
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conceptualized condition of  all that persons do for and to each other in history in response to 
history.  Having history is to have a life intertwined with the lives of  all others.  Our historicity 
occurs in our relationships with all that affects us and all that we encounter as we 
inquire into the world that we experience.  “Having” historicity is the state or 
attribute of all persons acting in the temporalities in which they experience life’s 
self-sustaining operations in an enduring universe.47 This includes our 
vulnerability as well as our flourishing. 
This definition of historicity is a stipulation concinnated within the framework 
laid out above of the reparative project to give a worthwhile explanation of 
meaningfulness (or “understanding”).  It is conceived so as to avoid the faults 
found in other accounts of what it is for humans to have history; and also to allow 
for meaningfulness to be found in the accumulated human past, as against the 
difficulties for such a notion raised first by the breach with metaphysical grounds 
of moral value and, latterly, by both extension and by new lines of thought, raised 
upon our improved knowledge of the unity of human experience and the non-
human world.  When human experience can no longer be opposed to nature by 
calling it history, we must re-describe what having a history is for all beings.  One 
great task for the philosophy of history is to insure that this integration of the 
human and the natural by its capacity to nourish our relationship with people 
who lived before our time and with the past in general, as theory, knowledge, or 
experience, however far this goes toward or falls short of fully leveling the two, 
enriches our the accuracy, usefulness, and moral weight of our response to 
history-nature rather than deflate or impoverish it. 
Three advantages of this concept of historicity already appear.  First, it is 
congruent with the problem itself of somehow integrating history and nature 
while allowing for judgments of value from the human perspective.  It does not 
directly “solve” this problem, but at least it is not based on denial of the problem, 
nor does it deflate judgment or understanding.  Second, this enables us to create 
responses to history without tying our responses to historicality, i.e., to the 
 
47 For present purposes, I define a temporality as an individual or group lived experience expressed as a 
schema of time; and/or as the theory of time necessary support and/or understand to the actual beliefs or 
practices of a group.  A temporality can “objective” mechanical time, or lived time, or any form of historical 
time.  Also, non-humans can have temporalities; and, although we humans have minimal cognitive access 
to these, we somehow, with uneasy appreciation, try to take them into account from our point of view as 
our lives are intertwined with the lives or existences of the rest of the universe. 
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historical particulars that interest us.  It thus gives philosophy of history its proper 
broad purchase for theorizing culture and as philosophical anthropology, rather 
than limiting it to historical theory or methodology, as I hold Koselleck historicity 
does.  And third, it is adequate to history.  It covers the history of all the kinds of 
things that enter into our historicity by our encountering them in history.  
Independent of any and all neo-materialisms or their descendants, being without 
regard to whether we learn that reality is ultimately energy impulses or data bytes 
or vital spirits or hard matter, this conception allows us to think about all the 
moving parts we must apply to historiographic accounts that concern all kinds of 
living things and the cosmic and local histories of the resources they use.   
In sum, this definition meets the complexity of the problem and of the 
experiential knowledge that brings us to face the problem.  But what then of 
meaningfulness and of our most important values?  The capacity of historicity for 
meaning is more important than the capacity for complexity, although the two 
things are related.  A repaired historicity suggests that historicity includes 
something by means of which genetic or structural complexity cannot deflate the 
human values arising from our whole experience encountered in history. Without 
demonstrating this, the thesis that meaning is wholly a phenomenon emergent 
from complexity would take the form of limiting the complexity of the whole.  
This result would be self-contradictory; but, beyond this, it is even more 
important to state why historicity has a moral weight that is not stopped by the 
ontology of our scientific knowledge at any present or future point.48  How does 
this understanding of historicity lead us back to history—to collective human 
history, to other histories of the biosphere, and to the persons of all species whom 
historicity marks and who become historical, to their and our world of meanings, 
our moral world? 
Let us return to the simplest understanding of historicity.  If our (or any 
being’s) “having” historicity means to be the kind of being that has history, then 
this quality must include something more than having a history in the sense of 
history as the flow of causally determined events.  For, if to have history is simply 
this, then there is no need for a concept like historicity; Heidegger was correct in 
 
48 It is possible to argue that the notion that the fullness of reality is beyond our grasp is the great discovery 
of several streams of modern philosophy, as in the work of James, Dewey, and Whitehead. 
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this regard.  Beings with historicity in this sense are just historical beings.  If the 
word adds nothing, it’s just another term for the imbecile jackhammer of fate and 
chance; or for the current dominant paradigm of scientific knowledge; or 
perhaps, in terms of social and intellectual history, for our own chosen amoral 
and selfish tumble through time by compulsive repetition of what the growth of 
ratio, machinic reason, and capital, which defines modernity, whether we start it 
from Plato or Gutenberg or James Watt or Charles Babbage or Henry Ford—
that is, the will to knowledge as power that would strip away everything in culture 
except “The will to grow ...everywhere written large, and to grow at no matter what 
or whose expense....the very screeches of the pipe to which humanity is actually 
dancing.”49  This is both the historicity Koselleck sees and the opposite of the 
historicity Heidegger wants to see. 
Nothing compels historicity to be otherwise if we cannot show a different 
vision of our behavior and our existence—but showing otherwise is the exact cash value 
of  the concept.  Universal speculative philosophy of history was a succession of 
attempts to reach past the evacuation of meaning from our behavior that 
mechanistic philosophy and science caused us to feel.  Along with the advantages 
mentioned above, the way of conceiving historicity that I propose, because it is 
conformed to a different problem, avoids reduction. 
Furthermore, a substantive case can be made for meaning in historiography 
and reflection on the past in ways that this concept of the condition of historicity 
suggests.  The interdependence of life involves all operations of all existents as 
both agents and patients.  But as to human agents—and all non-human agents 
we recognize as persons as we come to know more about them: they participate 
in the maintenance and well-being of their lives in the largest possible capacity 
that we can know of.  This indeed, is why we value the category of personhood, 
as a kind of illimitable comprehensiveness of conscious activity in all its 
dimensions intelligible to ourselves.50  We can handily describe the practice of 
 
49 Henry James, The American Scene, in Collected Travel Writings: Great Britain and America, New York, Library of 
America, 1993, 400. 
50 My words here relies on a canonical formulation of the personalist principle by Randall Auxier as my 
reference point: “For all its vexing ambiguity, the term ‘person’ goes further than any other in collecting 
the values we associate with dignity, honor, knowledge, truth, and, so they say, every other fundamental 
value, excepting only the precognitive values (such as feeling, pleasure, and perhaps beauty), and perhaps 
not even these.  Since the idea of knowing definitely presupposes “person” (a knowers who values the 
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this capacity in a word borrowed from John Dewey: inquiry.51  The life-
supporting activity of historicity is a process of inquiry in which the agents learn 
of, experience, explore, and respond to their vulnerabilities.  Their existential 
character derives as much from being patients as from being agents, from 
suffering events and actions as much as from causing them or controlling forces.  
This perspective of personhood can be a basis for respondents to history to 
reflect, write, or otherwise create, enhance, judge, and value those parts of the 
vast total of experience that interest them.  And so the risk of automating or 
otherwise reductively treating history by linking it to nature brings us closer to 
the particular and special situations of persons in their historicity—in their 
responses to history—rather than removing us farther away.  
This idea of historicity can take us even further.  Historicity must be a good, 
else the concept could not be reparative; it would not have been needful; causal 
determination would have been enough.  This good need not be teleological or 
transcendent, nor must it be neither.  What is required for such a restoring and 
repairing good is that it be adequate to history—to that pastness through which 
it is sought and the events to which it responds —rather than separated from it.  
It therefore must name the inquiry common to the activity of agents as a whole, 
if not every actor, because every instance of meaning or value, like every physical 
event, and like every bioform, is profoundly interdependent with a vast number 
of other instances.  And this common inquiry we can argue to be a good. 
Seeking repair of this kind, Hans-Georg Gadamer held that we live in a 
contexture of meaning that is made by  the “historical effect.”  The past-carrying-
forward, or tradition, is not only temporal existence, and not only the source of 
 
cognitive act) at a very basic level, the issue of whether there is any way around using this idea has 
concentrated itself at two levels, one theoretical and one practical.....  Still, ‘person’...is not self, not subject, 
not ghost in the machine, neither essence nor non-essence.  If the idea has a meaning, it lies in the effort we 
exert in imagining one another, and the use made by the patient of such agency to some sort of social 
awareness of himself or herself, and to adjust that awareness to the demands placed on us by our 
situatedness.  There is no reason a priori to assume that institutions, communities, animals, and ecosystems 
are incapable of assimilating the ways in which they are experienced into the experience that constitutes 
their forms of order” (“The Certainty Principle,” Eidos: A Journal for Philosophy of Culture, vol. 1, no. 3, 2018, 
3, 4). 
51 Development of this idea will be found in the section of John Herman Randall’s Nature and Historical 
Experience: Essays in Naturalism and The Theory of History, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958, called 
“Toward the Theory of History” (23–120), a thoroughgoingly functionalist analysis that deserves more 
attention than it gets. 
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our self-knowledge, but also for him the creative energy with which we adapt.52  
Tradition thus understood is indispensable to movement away from habitual or 
received views and ways of life.  Under this view, part of the force of tradition is 
that it effects the critique of tradition.53  Because tradition is something held in 
common by definition, Gadamer’s view is that our understanding is not an 
atomized search but, as I put it, an interdependent one.  This way of pushing 
finite temporality into common creative endeavor is Gadamer’s advance on the 
early Heidegger. Gadamerian historicity is the moving force of life; and so, as the 
concept accounts for this order of things, what historicity does for us when we use 
it is to augment our awareness of this reality and therefore our openness.54  But if 
historicity as a fact is an inescapable power over us, then why is historicity also a 
resting choice necessary for repairing our mistaking of tradition as carcerative 
rather than as liberating?  Historical consciousness alone need not be prescriptive, 
however descriptive or profoundly emotional it is. 
To find normativity, we must recognize that, behind debating how to tell the 
stories that are in historians’ minds, philosophizing about the quality and 
condition of having history has a substance understanding the social bonds that 
enable us to live together in a world.  Every person reflecting on the past, 
including historians, is not simply recording facts or narrating opinions; each, in 
addition, is making, or breaking, or re-making these social bonds by which 
universal interdependence can be turned into the good of flourishing life.  Our 
lives are not only doing or thinking, acting or reflecting on our own private 
accounts.  They are parts of the whole. 
Our moral response to being parts of the whole, as enacted in reflecting on 
or studying the past and hence participating in the whole to greater effect and in 
higher degrees of intensity, must be to nourish and support these bonds.  We do 
this to the degree that is most completely adequated to history by fully responding 
to the common opportunity that is life and to the common end in the grave that 
history tells us about.  My concern here us not the epistemic, or theory virtues, 
 
52 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, New York 
Continuum, 1999, 266, 277–280. 
53 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 300–306. 
54 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 355–363.  Gadamer defines historicity as our “standing and sacting” within 
the limits of finitude. 
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or even the performative virtues.55  I am describing a moral ideal that not only 
applies to historians but that finds a special purpose, force, and effect in our 
relationship to all other beings through historicity, since our past is a vast aspect 
of the interdependence necessary for survival.  All persons can sustain that bond 
by repairing it.  This cannot mean to erase loss but to bridge it by the deepest 
and fullest connection with past persons of which we are capable as a moral ideal.  
This not mere empathy.  It is the compassion to which recognition of the other 
brings us.  If historiography is largely a body of interpretations that, arising from 
the consequences of the historical circumstances of their authors, institute 
exclusions, denials, psychic repressions, and real oppressions upon others, if, in 
short, history as a science and a study and a subjectivity is often an exercise of 
power, our moral duty that theoretically arises from historicity is not simply to 
explain the past under color of objectivity but, at the limit of our finitude, to be 
brutally spurred to improve our moral and social world by extending compassion 
to all our forebears in the face of the sublime and  unfeeling power of that 
intertwines history and nature. 
This is the moral coherence we can find in historicity, apart from the 
intellectual or historiographic coherences we seek or do not seek, while keeping 
our understanding of the contingency of the real world and avoiding theodicy.  
The particular, though capacious, purpose of understanding historicity is to wrap 
moral meaning into our reception of facts by illuminating the way that the moral 
force of being historical underlies the choices of moral agents to act as they do, at 
every moment they chose to do it, to make their lives meaningful.  Under this 
reparative axiology, historicity is a way of looking at the work moral agents do in 
the situations that history puts them into—a particular frame of reference for 
human behavior that builds a moral perspective out of the hard facts of pastness.  
Through reflecting on the past, it can become part of a prescription we give 
ourselves in order reparatively to respond to history, change, and loss.   We 
activate historicity from pre-condition to historical existence by our response with 
which to answer mere history.  It can become the collective attempt to find a way 
back from disappointment or despair; and it has been this since the first 
 
55 For a summary of some of the literature on virtues in historical theory see Guy Axtell, “The Dialectics of 
Objectivity,” Journal of the Philosophy of History, vol. 6, 2012, 341–350, doi: 10.1163/18722636-12341236. 
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understanding of loss and death.  It might fail or be feeble; at best, it only just 
stands up to the onrush of events. 
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